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Abstract.
Security in information systems is a complex problem. Single solutions to complex problems don't
exist and matching the appropriate solution (or more accurately, a set of solutions) to a requirement
is necessary.
What's in and what's out?
Before we can directly attack the information security problem, we must define terms and scope.
This paper addresses a broad spectrum of information security including this list of definitions.
Definitions:
* Confidentiality. Unintended recipients can't read our traffic.  Confidentiality includes
secrecy of the data.
   * Authenticity. Unintended originators can't fake traffic. Nobody forged my messages.
Authenticity is a superset of integrity.
   * Integrity. Traffic hasn't been tampered with. What you got is what I really sent you.
   * Non-repudiation. I can't get away with saying something and later denying it.
   * Access control. Unauthorized users can't use network and computing resources. More
colloquially, keep the riff-raff out of my corner of the 'net.
   * Assurance of service. The network is available for use when I need it.  Resistance to
denial of service attacks.
   * Traffic analysis. Ability to derive intelligence from the addresses of messages, even if the
contents are confidentiality-protected.
   * Traffic flow analysis. Derivation of intelligence inferences by observing flows to and
from commands and individuals.
   * Interceptability. Ability of unintended recipients to receive traffic (regardless of whether
they can read it).
   * Jammability. Vulnerability of a link to interruption by signal interference.
Outside of the scope of this note are:
   * Availability and survivability issues. Some commentators (including the Defense Science
Board, for example) include these issues under the general title of security. This is understandable
if you extrapolate from the electric power perspective -- security of the electrical industry clearly
includes. I am treating this issue as a l gitimate plowshares-->swords issue, but not a security issue.
Disaster recovery is a subset of the survivability issue. Resistance to intra-network denial of service
attacks is definitely included in the security domain however.
* QoS control. Ability to allocate networking resources to the highest priority needs is a
critical plowshares-->swords issue too. But it's not security.
Existing standards framework work.
ISO 7498-2, the security architecture reference model, applies the possibility of providing security
services at different layers:
Service  Layer
---------------------------------------------------------------
Confidentiality 1, 2, 3, 4, 7
Authentication 3, 4, 7
Integrity 3, 4, 7
Access control 3, 4, 7
Non-repudiation 7
Unfortunately, this table is typical ISO -- it tells you at which layers security services are
theoretically possible. But it doesn't provide any information regarding where it's a good idea and
where it's a clumsy and expensive idea that is counter to interoperability objectives. Remember that
the Reference Model, including the security part, is ISO's means of deconflicting various
committees ... and in this case, not much more. Additionally, security issues such as traffic analysis,
traffic flow analysis and jammability are not considered in the ISO model.
Further, the existence of an ISO standard tells us nothing about the existence of any products. If we
intend to beat commercial industry plowshares into swords, this is a critical omission of our inquiry
if not of the standard.  The programmatic landscape is littered with a few attempts, like
CANEWARE and BLACKER, that attempted to solve security issues – principally confidentiality
– at the middle layers.  The solutions were clumsy enough never to see the implementation light of
day.
Organize thinking.
While the Security Architectural Reference Model is insufficient to our needs, the ISO Reference
Model which defines services at different levels of abstraction is a very useful place to start. We
can define and classify security services in much the same way that we classify network services.
The model provides the means to properly match requirements and solutions. Furthermore, while
the ISO Reference Model has been applied to networks, it is equally useful when applied to end
systems (e.g. computers) attached to the network.
Let's see if we can add a bit of common sense. Thumb rule: the higher the layer at which you can
gain appropriate security service, the less you have to depend on the network to provide the service.
For example, with secure e-mail -- an Application Layer implementation of a security service -- all
security functionality is provided in end systems, none is required of the network infrastructure
(links, routers, gateways, etc). This means that it is not necessary to own or control the network in
order to have secure service. In concise terms, with application layer security we have
confidentiality and authenticity over untrusted networks. The cost of a security service is going to
be proportional to the size of the security enclave that you must secure. Limiting the enclave to a
single end system has considerable attractiveness -- indeed when that end system is a single user
(e.g. PC), then a great deal of the Orange Book requirements become irrelevant. Which means that
the first possibilities to examine are those at Layer 7.
Organizing matrix.
ISO RM hint Buzz Problem Solution Examples






































 Application Layer security.
 The focus at the application layer is on security of the data.  The network that it flows through and
the computers that it is stored in are irrelevant -- the data itself is the security target.
 For example, an e-mail message that has body parts that have been encrypted and digitally signed
now has confidentiality and authenticity protection regardless of the means of delivery, whether
over a private network, the public Internet, the enemy's network or even sneakernet.
Advantages of this media independence include:
   *  since the data committed to the network is encrypted and 'safe', we have no inhibitions
against mixing multiple levels of classification on the same communications system.  The reason
for security-segregated networks disappears.
   *  cross-program and cross-ally issues become much more tractable.  Sharing network
connectivity and sharing data are two separable problems.
   *  protecting the data itself removes us from the 'chain as strong as weakest link' situations
that inhibit scale and interoperability
Enclave Protection
Enclave protection, in abstract form, is setting up a perimeter and then protecting it from
penetration.  In networks, we set up these communities of interest and typically protect them with
firewalls.  In individual computers, we do this by setting up file systems and then allowing certain
individuals to access just parts of the file system (e.g. home directories). In databases, certain users
may be accorded read or write privileges to certain columns or rows, but not allowed into others.
Note that the protections all apply to the perimeter and are focussed on securing the network or
computer or database -- not the data.  The shortcomings of this means-ends mismatch are well
known:
   *  These protections are easily circumvented through insider attacks
  *  The protections tend to be brittle; a break in any location can compromise a great deal.
   *  The protections here are best targeted at avoiding denial of service attacks, not in
protecting your data.
   *  Mixing multiple levels of security with these mechanisms is very difficult to do -- the
grail has been elusive for many years.
Link protection.
Protecting individual links has been the norm in the US military for many years now.  It has taken
the form of link encryption using devices such as the KG-84 (and it's predecessor the KW-7) and
telephone connections using STU-IIIs (secure telephone units).  These are useful protections
against traffic analysis and traffic flow analysis vulnerabilities.  Low Probability of Detection and
Intercept schemes: spread spectrum in radio, hard-to-tap fiber optic in wirelines, TEMPEST in
electronic equipment, target similar vulnerabilities as well as provide jam resistance.  Since
jamming is usually only a problem in radio networks (as opposed to fiber optic and copper links),
you don't find jam protections in the wired portions of the network.  Locks on the computer's power
switch and password protection of the BIOS are in this category.  Indeed, in general, these
protections are good for a single link or single computer only -- they have to be peeled off before
the link can feed its contents into a router.  This means that link protection is a very poor way to
provide confidentiality since all the routers must be both physically and logically protected and the
network can only run at a single level of classification.
Some examples: the good, the bad and the ugly.
Credit card transactions over the Internet.
Most of us have now bought something over the net. When you're ready to buy, your browser
opens a secure connection to a server (signified by the closed padlock icon on most browsers), you
type in your credit card number and the deal is closed.  The requirement here is for confidentiality -
- you don't want somebody to crib your credit card number.  The solution under the icon is a Secure
Sockets Layer connection where the browser and server exchange keys and encrypt the data.  So
far, so good -- we've matched a confidentiality requirement with an object level security solution
(across the top line of the matrix above).  And none of the reported theft of credit card numbers
appear to involve any breakage here.
But several thefts of credit card numbers have been reported.  What happened? Once your credit
card has been securely transmitted it is stored by the server ... in plaintext form.  Typically, the
server is not using object level security to protect the data, but the computer is access-controlled
with a password and the read/write privileges associated with access to certain files.  In other
words, we're seeing perimeter control solutions applied to confidentiality problems.  Once those
perimeter controls are breached, not just one credit card, but the whole file of them is
compromised.
A better approach would be to keep the same object level confidentiality protection on the credit
card data itself.  In other words, store the encrypted data and only decrypt it when needed.  The
existing access control mechanism shouldn't be abandoned, but it becomes another layer in the
defense.
The Walker Case
In 1985, US counterespionage uncovered an insider attack against the Navy's worldwide
communications system.  The critical breach involved sale of the KW-7 (crypto machine) key cards
to the Soviet Union.  This compromise had been going on for years. The security requirements for
the Navy's system included confidentiality and authenticity, but also most of the other items in the
matrix above, including resistance to traffic analysis.  The solution was to use link layer encryption
(it was known as bulk encryption then) to solve both.  In the form of our matrix, we were using a
link level solution to solve an application level problem.  This resulted in a brittle system -- once it
is compromised in one place (the key cards from a communications station in Philippines or
Stockton) it broke everywhere.  This is because most KW-7s were keyed alike for interoperability
reasons.
The Navy's intelligence community was less heavily impacted by the Walker revelations than the
general service Navy communications because the intelligence community used a superencryption
scheme known then as Streamliner -- the data was end-to-end encrypted before it was passed to the
communications station for transmission.  This meant that for this traffic, the traffic analysis
vulnerability became exploitable by the compromise but the confidentiality remained intact.  In
today's Internet lingo, the Streamliner system is a form of virtual private network.
Ironically, the sea services used what we would today call object level encryption (then known as
off-line encryption) prior to the advent of the KW-7.  The problem was that the offline systems
(Adonis, Diana, etc) were labor intensive.  Rather than automate the offline systems (something
that computers can easily do today), we shifted targets to securing the communications pipe rather
than securing the data and a brittle system resulted.
We must point out that we seem not to have learned the lessons from the Walker case: we replaced
the compromised KW-7 with the newer KG-84 but the basic bulk encryption approach persists.
We see it today in SIPRNET (Secured IP Router NETwork).  The security segregation requires us
to plumb the network with both SIPRNET and NIPRNET (with negative availability and
performance effects).  And because we rely on link level encryption for confidentiality, we have to
segregate SIPRNET so far as to deny access to our allies. Media-independent approaches to
confidentiality would greatly improve the interoperability cost and speed of installation factors.
Halting steps forward?
At this writing (March 2002) the Department of Defense is circulating a draft “Overarching
Wireless Policy.”
The draft policy’s scope explicitly includes any radio networks to be connected to the Global
Information Grid - a fairly broad scope that clearly includes such things as Navy Fleet Satellite
Communications and DoD MilStar and their follow-on programs.   Since the most appropriate
solutions for authenticity and confidentiality are application layer solutions targeted at the data
rather than the media, the scope is inevitably larger than just wireless – it must encompass virtually
all DoD networks1.
A policy section sentence states: “Only assured channels employing NSA-approved, Type-1 end-
to-end encryption shall be used to transmit CLASSIFIED information”.   The critical term here is
‘end to end’.  This policy statement seems to indicate use of application level security for
confidentiality purposes as advocated by this paper.  This would be a very significant improvement
in the military security posture if the interpretation is correct.
Impact.  It is also represents a significant shift in programs's budgets, putting the emphasis on
confidentiality in applications rather than in networks.
One step back.  But the definition of 'end to end' is stated in the Definitions enclosure: “End-to-
End. AIS from the end user device up to the security border of a D D network or between two user
devices connected by a DoD / non-DoD network (to include the air interface).”   This definition is
confusing enough to make the object quite unclear.  Further, it reads much like a definition of link
level security rather than application level.
General observations and conclusion.
                                         
1 Reading the draft, I’m not at all sure this was intentional, but that’s the effect.
From these examples, we can draw some general conclusions:
   *  The higher on the matrix you can solve a security problem, the better.  In particular, if
you can solve confidentiality problems at the application layer, you can use general purpose
network.  This has obvious cost benefits (no special purpose plumbing), and it increases the
interoperability quotient -- you can share what networks that do exist with others.
   *  None of the solutions are mutually exclusive.  It's entirely possible to solve the
confidentiality problem with, say, end-to-end secure e-mail, communicate entirely within a closed
enclave (carefully firewalled or air-gapped to keep out outsiders) and use link encryption to
frustrate traffic analysis by eavesdroppers.  Both of the latter two measures help the confidentiality
picture -- they're layers in the layered defense -- but they're there primarily for other purposes.
   *  When we consider acquiring information systems, we want to express the lower layer
requirements to the 'plumbers' -- those who build and provision the network.  We want to express
the top layer requirements to the application designers.  Mixing these signals (graphically
visualized as crossing the matrix diagonally) results in asking the right requirements ... but of the
wrong providers.  Which is almost as bad as specifying the wrong requirements.
   *  Most importantly, the specific security requirements must be properly matched with a
solution that directly targets the requirement.  In the matrix above, this is visually illustrated
horizontal lines between problem and solution; diagonal traces indicate a mismatch.
